Small Versus Big Government Essays -- Politics Political Essays

Small Versus Big Government Introduction The difference in the U.S. Government at it's founding vrs today in reference, to the idea of small vrs big government. The Government originally had only concern with the Military, tariffs and all forms of Foreign relations Today the government regulates all aspects of a persons life. Tax,the redistributation of wealth,healthcare and have a strong influence on local governments through the withholding funds. Competing Interest Inconsistencies in Government polices can be attributed to differences in the many different public Popular Majority will not remain stable for long, since no one can please everyone people will shift their support. Many different interest contained within a majority Political Promises must be made in order to bring together a Popular Majority. If a politician breaks these promises he risks losing future votes. Restraints on Growth of Government Reasons for the first 150 years of U.S. government remaining small. The constitution was read under a strict interpretation, stopping t... Small Versus Big Government Essays -- Politics Political Essays Small Versus Big Government Introduction The difference in the U.S. Government at it's founding vrs today in reference, to the idea of small vrs big government. The Government originally had only concern with the Military, tariffs and all forms of Foreign relations Today the government regulates all aspects of a persons life. Tax,the redistributation of wealth,healthcare and have a strong influence on local governments through the withholding funds. Competing Interest Inconsistencies in Government polices can be attributed to differences in the many different public Popular Majority will not remain stable for long, since no one can please everyone people will shift their support. Many different interest contained within a majority Political Promises must be made in order to bring together a Popular Majority. If a politician breaks these promises he risks losing future votes. Restraints on Growth of Government Reasons for the first 150 years of U.S. government remaining small. The constitution was read under a strict interpretation, stopping t...

Suffering in Job and The Aeneid Essay -- Comparison Compare Contrast E

Suffering in Job and The Aeneid      Ã‚   Throughout Virgil's Aeneid and Job   from the Old Testament, great obstacles block the paths of the protagonists.  Ã‚   Mental and physical, anguish is placed upon Job and Aeneas.   Though both men suffer extreme pain, the extent and content of the tribulations are different.      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Job's suffering is placed upon him without provocation.   Aeneas also believes his  ³pain [is] so great and unmerited! ² (Virgil 2.89).   Juno's hatred towards the Trojans, however,   is fueled by many things such as the descent of the Trojans from Jupiter's illegitimate son and the fact that the Trojan people are fated to destroy Carthage, her favorite city.      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  God takes away everone deat to Job.   He is physically alone except for Eliphaz, Bilad, Zophar and Elihu.   These men, although they are the only people to speak to Job, offer very little sympathy.   They blame him for his misfortune and tell Job that he has probably angered God to an extent that his punishment is deserved.   Aeneas, though,   has the companionship of his men and other friends which help him along his journey.   Not  Ã‚   only are his men friendly and admiring of Aeneas, they are on his side.   They   help him on his journey.   They are all fighting for the same cause.   This fact alone makes Job's misfortune more taxing.      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Their mental anguish is not limited to matters of this world.   Each man is faced with dillemas concerning their spiritual beliefs. Though he begs and calls to God for an explanation, Job receives nothing.   This causes alone causes more mental anguish than anything else that happens in either work.   Job's family is exterminated, he is pile of fermenting flesh, and he has no sign from God as to why t... ... He has thousands of mortals working with him, not to mention the fact that he has the gods working to protect him too.      Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The proportionate level of suffering weighs heavily on Job's side. Aeneas has some tough times, but Job suffers almost beyond human capabilities. Aeneas had moments of excitement and adventure along his path, while Job had utter misery.   Aeneas had far from a pain free voyage, but he was also worlds away from feeling the desperation and unheralded torture of Job.    Works Cited Block, Elizabeth. The Effects of Divine Manifestation on the Reader's Perspective in Vergil's Aeneid.   Arno Press, New York, 1981. Green, Joel B., & Longman, Tremper (Eds.).   Holy Bible -- The Everday Study Edition. Dallas: Word Publishing. 1996. Quinn, Kenneth. Vergil's Aeneid, A Critical Description. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1968.

Egoism and Altruism

1. Metaethics The term â€Å"meta† means after or beyond, and, consequently, the notion of metaethics involves a removed, or bird’s eye view of the entire project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined area of moral philosophy. It covers issues from moral semantics to moral epistemology[->0].Two issues, though, are prominent: (1) metaphysical issues concerning whether morality exists independently of humans, and (2) psychological issues concerning the underlying mental basis of our moral judgments and conduct. a. Metaphysical Issues: Objectivism and Relativism Metaphysics is the study of the kinds of things that exist in the universe. Some things in the universe are made of physical stuff, such as rocks; and perhaps other things are nonphysical in nature, such as thoughts, spirits, and gods.The metaphysical component of metaethics involves discovering specifically whether moral values are eternal truths that exist in a spirit-like realm, or simply human conventions. There are two general directions that discussions of this topic take, one other-worldly and one this-worldly. Proponents of the other-worldly view typically hold that moral values are objective[->1] in the sense that they exist in a spirit-like realm beyond subjective human conventions.They also hold that they are absolute, or eternal, in that they never change, and also that they are universal insofar as they apply to all rational creatures around the world and throughout time[->2]. The most dramatic example of this view is Plato[->3], who was inspired by the field of mathematics. When we look at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be timeless concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in the universe. Humans do not invent numbers, and humans cannot alter them.Plato explained the eternal character of mathematics by stating that they are abstract entities that exist in a spirit-like realm. He noted that moral values also are absolute truths and thus are also abstract, spirit-like entities. In this sense, for Plato, moral values are spiritual objects. Medieval philosophers commonly grouped all moral principles together under the heading of â€Å"eternal law† which were also frequently seen as spirit-like objects. 17th century British philosopher Samuel Clarke described them as spirit-like relationships rather than spirit-like objects.In either case, though, they exist in a sprit-like realm. A different other-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality is divine commands issuing from God’s will. Sometimes called voluntarism (or divine command theory[->4]), this view was inspired by the notion of an all-powerful God[->5] who is in control of everything. God simply wills things, and they become reality. He wills the physical world into existence , he wills human life into existence and, similarly, he wills all moral values into existence.Proponents of this view, such as medieval philosopher William of Ockham[->6], believe that God wills moral principles, such as â€Å"murder is wrong,† and these exist in God’s mind as commands. God informs humans of these commands by implanting us with moral intuitions or revealing these commands in scripture. The second and more this-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality follows in the skeptical philosophical tradition, such as that articulated by Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and denies the objective status of moral values.Technically, skeptics did not reject moral values themselves, but only denied that values exist as spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind of God. Moral values, they argued, are strictly human inventions, a position that has since been called moral relativism[->7]. There are two distinct forms of moral relativism. The first is individual relativism, which holds that individual people create their own moral standards. Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, argued that the superhuman creates his or her morality distinct from and in reaction to the slave-like value system of the masses.The second is cultural relativism which maintains that morality is grounded in the approval of one’s society – and not simply in the preferences of individual people. This view was advocated by Sextus, and in more recent centuries by Michel Montaigne and William Graham Sumner. In addition to espousing skepticism and relativism, this-worldly approaches to the metaphysical status of morality deny the absolute and universal nature of morality and hold instead that moral values in fact change from society to society throughout time and throughout the world.They frequently attempt to defend their position by citing examples of values that differ dramatically from one culture to another, such as attitudes about po lygamy, homosexuality and human sacrifice. b. Psychological Issues in Metaethics A second area of metaethics involves the psychological basis of our moral judgments and conduct, particularly understanding what motivates us to be moral. We might explore this subject by asking the simple question, â€Å"Why be moral? † Even if I am aware of basic moral standards, such as don’t kill and don’t steal, this does not necessarily mean that I will be psychologically compelled to act on them.Some answers to the question â€Å"Why be moral? † are to avoid punishment, to gain praise[->8], to attain happiness, to be dignified, or to fit in with society. i. Egoism and Altruism One important area of moral psychology concerns the inherent selfishness of humans. 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes[->9] held that many, if not all, of our actions are prompted by selfish desires. Even if an action seems selfless, such as donating to charity, there are still selfis h causes for this, such as experiencing power over other people.This view is called psychological egoism[->10] and maintains that self-oriented interests ultimately motivate all human actions. Closely related to psychological egoism is a view called psychological hedonism which is the view that pleasure is the specific driving force behind all of our actions. 18th century British philosopher Joseph Butler[->11] agreed that instinctive selfishness and pleasure prompt much of our conduct. However, Butler argued that we also have an inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence to others.This view is called psychological altruism and maintains that at least some of our actions are motivated by instinctive benevolence. ii. Emotion and Reason A second area of moral psychology involves a dispute concerning the role of reason in motivating moral actions. If, for example, I make the statement â€Å"abortion is morally wrong,† am I making a rational assessment or only expressing my feelings? On the one side of the dispute, 18th century British philosopher David Hume[->12] argued that moral assessments involve our emotions, and not our reason.We can amass all the reasons we want, but that alone will not constitute a moral assessment. We need a distinctly emotional reaction in order to make a moral pronouncement. Reason might be of service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume’s words, â€Å"reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions. † Inspired by Hume’s anti-rationalist views, some 20th century philosophers, most notably A. J. Ayer, similarly denied that moral assessments are factual descriptions. For example, although the statement â€Å"it is good to donate to charity† may on the surface look as though it is a factual description about charity, it is not.Instead, a moral utterance like this involves two things. First, I (the speaker) I am expressing my personal feelings of approval about charitable donations and I am in essence saying â€Å"Hooray for charity! † This is called the emotive element insofar as I am expressing my emotions about some specific behavior. Second, I (the speaker) am trying to get you to donate to charity and am essentially giving the command, â€Å"Donate to charity! † This is called the prescriptive element in the sense that I am prescribing some specific behavior.From Hume’s day forward, more rationally-minded philosophers have opposed these emotive theories of ethics (see non-cognitivism in ethics[->13]) and instead argued that moral assessments are indeed acts of reason. 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant[->14] is a case in point. Although emotional factors often do influence our conduct, he argued, we should nevertheless resist that kind of sway. Instead, true moral action is motivated only by reason when it is free from emotions and desires.A recent rationalist approach, offered by Kurt Baier (1958), was proposed in direct o pposition to the emotivist and prescriptivist theories of Ayer and others. Baier focuses more broadly on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when making moral choices. All of our moral choices are, or at least can be, backed by some reason or justification. If I claim that it is wrong to steal someone’s car, then I should be able to justify my claim with some kind of argument. For example, I could argue that stealing Smith’s car is wrong since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights, or put the thief at risk of getting caught.According to Baier, then, proper moral decision making involves giving the best reasons in support of one course of action versus another. iii. Male and Female Morality A third area of moral psychology focuses on whether there is a distinctly female approach to ethics that is grounded in the psychological differences between men and women. Discussions of this issue focus on two claims: (1) traditional morality is ma le-centered, and (2) there is a unique female perspective of the world which can be shaped into a value theory.According to many feminist philosophers, traditional morality is male-centered since it is modeled after practices that have been traditionally male-dominated, such as acquiring property, engaging in business contracts, and governing societies. The rigid systems of rules required for trade and government were then taken as models for the creation of equally rigid systems of moral rules, such as lists of rights and duties. Women, by contrast, have traditionally had a nurturing role by raising children and overseeing domestic life. These tasks require less rule following, and more spontaneous and creative action.Using the woman’s experience as a model for moral theory, then, the basis of morality would be spontaneously caring for others as would be appropriate in each unique circumstance. On this model, the agent becomes part of the situation and acts caringly within t hat context. This stands in contrast with male-modeled morality where the agent is a mechanical actor who performs his required duty, but can remain distanced from and unaffected by the situation. A care-based approach to morality, as it is sometimes called, is offered by feminist ethicists as either a replacement for or a supplement to traditional male-modeled moral systems. . Normative Ethics Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or wrong.So, based on the G olden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a single principle against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of foundational principles, or a set of good character traits. The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. Three strategies will be noted here: (1) virtue theories, (2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist theories. . Virtue Theories Many philosophers believe that morality consists of following precisely defined rules of conduct, such as â€Å"don’t kill,† or â€Å"don’t steal. † Presumably, I must learn these rules, and then make sure each of my actions live up to the rules. Virtue ethics[->15], however, places less emphasis on learning rules, and instead stresses the importance of devel oping good habits of character, such as benevolence (see moral character[->16]). Once I’ve acquired benevolence, for example, I will then habitually act in a benevolent manner.Historically, virtue theory is one of the oldest normative traditions in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized four virtues in particular, which were later called cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Other important virtues are fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good habits of character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid acquiring bad character traits, or vices, such as cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity.Virtue theory emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in one’s youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young. Aristotle[->17] argued that virtues are good habits that we acquire, which re gulate our emotions. For example, in response to my natural feelings of fear, I should develop the virtue of courage which allows me to be firm when facing danger. Analyzing 11 specific virtues, Aristotle argued that most virtues fall at a mean between more extreme character traits.With courage, for example, if I do not have enough courage, I develop the disposition of cowardice, which is a vice. If I have too much courage I develop the disposition of rashness which is also a vice. According to Aristotle, it is not an easy task to find the perfect mean between extreme character traits. In fact, we need assistance from our reason to do this. After Aristotle, medieval theologians supplemented Greek lists of virtues with three Christian ones, or theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity.Interest in virtue theory continued through the middle ages and declined in the 19th century with the rise of alternative moral theories below. In the mid 20th century virtue theory received special attention from philosophers who believed that more recent approaches ethical theories were misguided for focusing too heavily on rules and actions, rather than on virtuous character traits. Alasdaire MacIntyre (1984) defended the central role of virtues in moral theory and argued that virtues are grounded in and emerge from within social traditions. . Duty Theories Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to care for our children, and to not commit murder. Duty theories base morality on specific, foundational principles of obligation. These theories are sometimes called deontological, from the Greek word deon, or duty, in view of the foundational nature of our duty or obligation. They are also sometimes called nonconsequentialist since these principles are obligatory, irrespective of the consequences that might follow from our actions.For example, it is wrong to not care for our children even if it results in some great benefit, such as fina ncial savings. There are four central duty theories. The first is that championed by 17th century German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, who classified dozens of duties under three headings: duties to God, duties to oneself, and duties to others. Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds: a theoretical duty to know the existence and nature of God, and a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God.Concerning our duties towards oneself, these are also of two sorts: duties of the soul, which involve developing one’s skills and talents, and duties of the body, which involve not harming our bodies, as we might through gluttony or drunkenness, and not killing oneself. Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendorf divides these between absolute duties, which are universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the result of contracts between people. Absolute duties are of three sorts: avoid wronging others, treat people as eq uals, and romote the good of others. Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal one of which is the duty is to keep one’s promises. A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most generally, a â€Å"right† is a justified claim against another person’s behavior – such as my right to not be harmed by you (see also human rights[->18]). Rights and duties are related in such a way that the rights of one person implies the duties of another person. For example, if I have a right to payment of $10 by Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay me $10.This is called the correlativity of rights and duties. The most influential early account of rights theory is that of 17th century British philosopher John Locke[->19], who argued that the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone’s life, health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God. Following Locke, the United States Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson recognizes three foundational rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.Jefferson and others rights theorists maintained that we deduce other more specific rights from these, including the rights of property, movement, speech, and religious expression. There are four features traditionally associated with moral rights. First, rights are natural insofar as they are not invented or created by governments. Second, they are universal insofar as they do not change from country to country. Third, they are equal in the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of gender, race, or handicap.Fourth, they are inalienable which means that I ca not hand over my rights to another person, such as by selling myself into slavery. A third duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes a single principle of duty. Influenced by Pufendorf, Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and others, such as develop ing one’s talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls the â€Å"categorical imperative. A categorical imperative, he argued, is fundamentally different from hypothetical imperatives that hinge on some personal desire that we have, for example, â€Å"If you want to get a good job, then you ought to go to college. † By contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective of one’s personal desires, such as â€Å"You ought to do X. † Kant gives at least four versions of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an end. That is, we should always treat people with dignity, nd never use them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor’s car since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually.Suicide, for example, would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. Kant believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by appealing to this single principle of duty. A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W. D. Ross, which emphasizes prima facie duties. Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are â€Å"part of the fundamental nature of the universe. † However, Ross’s list of dutie s is much shorter, which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:  ·Fidelity: the duty to keep promises Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm them  ·Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us  ·Justice: the duty to recognize merit  ·Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of others  ·Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and intelligence  ·Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure others Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose between two conflicting duties. In a classic example, suppose I borrow my neighbor’s gun and promise to return it when he asks for it. One day, in a fit of rage, my neighbor pounds on my door and asks for the gun so that he can take vengeance on someone.On the one hand, the duty of fidelity obligates me to return the gun; on the other hand, the duty of nonmaleficence obligates me to avoid injuring others and thus not return the gun. According to Ross, I will intuitively kn ow which of these duties is my actual duty, and which is my apparent or prima facie duty. In this case, my duty of nonmaleficence emerges as my actual duty and I should not return the gun. c. Consequentialist Theories It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the consequences of our actions.According to consequentialism[->20], correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis of an action’s consequences: Consequentialism: An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable. Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper.Consequentialist theories are sometimes called teleologic al theories, from the Greek word telos, or end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining factor of its morality. Consequentialist theories became popular in the 18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive feature of consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable consequences of actions.Most versions of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In particular, competing consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people are relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:  ·Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action.  ·Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that act ion are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent. Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone. All three of these theories focus on the consequences of actions for different groups of people. But, like all normative theories, the above three theories are rivals of each other. They also yield different conclusions. Consider the following example. A woman was traveling through a developing country when she witnessed a car in front of her run off the road and roll over several times.She asked the hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the driver accelerated nervously past the scene. A few miles down the road the driver explained that in his country if someone assists an accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person responsible for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the assisting person could be held responsible for the death. The driver continued explaining that road accident victims are therefore usually left unattended and often die from exposure to the country’s harsh desert conditions.On the principle of ethical egoism[->21], the woman in this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences of her attempted assistance as she would be affected. Clearly, the decision to drive on would be the morally proper choice. On the principle of ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with the consequences of her action as others are affected, particularly the accident victim. Tallying only those consequences reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct choice, irrespective of the negative consequences that result for her.On the principle of utilitarianism, she must consider the consequences for both herself and the victim. The outcome here is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the overall benefit versus disbenefit of her action. i. Types of Utilitarianism J eremy Bentham[->22] presented one of the earliest fully developed systems of utilitarianism. Two features of his theory are noteworty. First, Bentham proposed that we tally the consequences of each action we perform and thereby determine on a case by case basis whether an action is morally right or wrong. This aspect of Bentham’s theory is known as act-utilitiarianism.Second, Bentham also proposed that we tally the pleasure and pain which results from our actions. For Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only consequences that matter in determining whether our conduct is moral. This aspect of Bentham’s theory is known as hedonistic utilitarianism. Critics point out limitations in both of these aspects. First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to waste time on leisure activities such as watching television, since our time could be spent in ways that produced a greater social benefit, such as charity work. But prohibiting leisure activities doesnâ €™t seem reasonable.More significantly, according to act-utilitarianism, specific acts of torture or slavery would be morally permissible if the social benefit of these actions outweighed the disbenefit. A revised version of utilitarianism called rule-utilitarianism addresses these problems. According to rule-utilitarianism, a behavioral code or rule is morally right if the consequences of adopting that rule are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone. Unlike act utilitarianism, which weighs the consequences of each particular action, rule-utilitarianism offers a litmus test only for the morality of moral rules, such as â€Å"stealing is wrong. Adopting a rule against theft clearly has more favorable consequences than unfavorable consequences for everyone. The same is true for moral rules against lying or murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, offers a three-tiered method for judging conduct. A particular action, such as stealing my neighbor’s car, is judged wrong sin ce it violates a moral rule against theft. In turn, the rule against theft is morally binding because adopting this rule produces favorable consequences for everyone. John Stuart Mill’s version of utilitarianism is rule-oriented.Second, according to hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasurable consequences are the only factors that matter, morally speaking. This, though, seems too restrictive since it ignores other morally significant consequences that are not necessarily pleasing or painful. For example, acts which foster loyalty and friendship are valued, yet they are not always pleasing. In response to this problem, G. E. Moore [->23]proposed ideal utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that we intuitively recognize as good or bad (and not simply as pleasurable or painful). Also, R. M.Hare proposed preference utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that fulfills our preferences. ii. Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory We have seen (in Secti on 1. b. i) that Hobbes was an advocate of the methaethical theory of psychological egoism—the view that all of our actions are selfishly motivated. Upon that foundation, Hobbes developed a normative theory known as social contract theory[->24], which is a type of rule-ethical-egoism. According to Hobbes, for purely selfish reasons, the agent is better off living in a world with moral rules than one without moral rules.For without moral rules, we are subject to the whims of other people’s selfish interests. Our property, our families, and even our lives are at continual risk. Selfishness alone will therefore motivate each agent to adopt a basic set of rules which will allow for a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules would include prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing. However, these rules will ensure safety for each agent only if the rules are enforced. As selfish creatures, each of us would plunder our neighbors’ property once their gua rds were down.Each agent would then be at risk from his neighbor. Therefore, for selfish reasons alone, we devise a means of enforcing these rules: we create a policing agency which punishes us if we violate these rules. 3. Applied Ethics Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the analysis of specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, or euthanasia. In recent years applied ethical issues have been subdivided into convenient groups such as medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics[->25], and sexual ethics[->26].Generally speaking, two features are necessary for an issue to be considered an â€Å"applied ethical issue. † First, the issue needs to be controversial in the sense that there are significant groups of people both for and against the issue at hand. The issue of drive-by shooting, for example, is not an applied ethical issue, since everyone agrees that this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue of g un control would be an applied ethical issue since there are significant groups of people both for and against gun control.The second requirement for an issue to be an applied ethical issue is that it must be a distinctly moral issue. On any given day, the media presents us with an array of sensitive issues such as affirmative action policies, gays in the military, involuntary commitment of the mentally impaired, capitalistic versus socialistic business practices, public versus private health care systems, or energy conservation. Although all of these issues are controversial and have an important impact on society, they are not all moral issues. Some are only issues of social policy.The aim of social policy is to help make a given society run efficiently by devising conventions, such as traffic laws, tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by contrast, concern more universally obligatory practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and are not confined to individual societies. Fre quently, issues of social policy and morality overlap, as with murder which is both socially prohibited and immoral. However, the two groups of issues are often distinct. For example, many people would argue that sexual promiscuity is mmoral, but may not feel that there should be social policies regulating sexual conduct, or laws punishing us for promiscuity. Similarly, some social policies forbid residents in certain neighborhoods from having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors are not offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a resident having a yard sale in one of these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualify as an applied ethical issue, the issue must be more than one of mere social policy: it must be morally relevant as well. In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues should be easy.With the issue of abortion, for example, we would simply determine its morality by consulting our normative principle of choice, such as act-utilitarianism. If a given abortion pr oduces greater benefit than disbenefit, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally acceptable to have the abortion. Unfortunately, there are perhaps hundreds of rival normative principles from which to choose, many of which yield opposite conclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative ethics between conflicting theories prevents us from using a single decisive procedure for determining the morality of a specific issue.The usual solution today to this stalemate is to consult several representative normative principles on a given issue and see where the weight of the evidence lies. a. Normative Principles in Applied Ethics Arriving at a short list of representative normative principles is itself a challenging task. The principles selected must not be too narrowly focused, such as a version of act-egoism that might focus only on an action’s short-term benefit. The principles must also be seen as having merit by people on both sides of an applied ethical issue.For this reason, principles that appeal to duty to God are not usually cited since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged in the debate. The following principles are the ones most commonly appealed to in applied ethical discussions:  ·Personal benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for the individual in question.  ·Social benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for society.  ·Principle of benevolence: help those in need. Principle of paternalism: assist others in pursuing their best interests when they cannot do so themselves.  ·Principle of harm: do not harm others.  ·Principle of honesty: do not deceive others.  ·Principle of lawfulness: do not violate the law.  ·Principle of autonomy: acknowledge a person’s freedom over his/her actions or physical body.  ·Principle of justice: acknowledge a person’s right to due process, fair compensation for harm done, a nd fair distribution of benefits.  ·Rights: acknowledge a person’s rights to life, information, privacy, free expression, and safety.The above principles represent a spectrum of traditional normative principles and are derived from both consequentialist and duty-based approaches. The first two principles, personal benefit and social benefit, are consequentialist since they appeal to the consequences of an action as it affects the individual or society. The remaining principles are duty-based. The principles of benevolence, paternalism, harm, honesty, and lawfulness are based on duties we have toward others. The principles of autonomy, justice, and the various rights are based on moral rights.An example will help illustrate the function of these principles in an applied ethical discussion. In 1982, a couple from Bloomington, Indiana gave birth to a baby with severe mental and physical disabilities. Among other complications, the infant, known as Baby Doe, had its stomach dis connected from its throat and was thus unable to receive nourishment. Although this stomach deformity was correctable through surgery, the couple did not want to raise a severely disabled child and therefore chose to deny surgery, food, and water for the infant.Local courts supported the parents’ decision, and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective surgery have been performed for Baby Doe? Arguments in favor of corrective surgery derive from the infant’s right to life and the principle of paternalism which stipulates that we should pursue the best interests of others when they are incapable of doing so themselves. Arguments against corrective surgery derive from the personal and social disbenefit which would result from such surgery. If Baby Doe survived, its quality of life would have been poor and in any case it probably would have died at an early age.Also, from the parent’s perspective, Baby Doe’s survival would have been a significant emotio nal and financial burden. When examining both sides of the issue, the parents and the courts concluded that the arguments against surgery were stronger than the arguments for surgery. First, foregoing surgery appeared to be in the best interests of the infant, given the poor quality of life it would endure. Second, the status of Baby Doe’s right to life was not clear given the severity of the infant’s mental impairment. For, to possess moral rights, it takes more than merely having a human body: certain cognitive functions must also be present.The issue here involves what is often referred to as moral personhood, and is central to many applied ethical discussions. b. Issues in Applied Ethics As noted, there are many controversial issues discussed by ethicists today, some of which will be briefly mentioned here. Biomedical ethics focuses on a range of issues which arise in clinical settings. Health care workers are in an unusual position of continually dealing with life and death situations. It is not surprising, then, that medical ethics issues are more extreme and diverse than other areas of applied ethics.Prenatal issues arise about the morality of surrogate mothering, genetic manipulation of fetuses, the status of unused frozen embryos, and abortion. Other issues arise about patient rights and physician’s responsibilities, such as the confidentiality of the patient’s records and the physician’s responsibility to tell the truth to dying patients. The AIDS crisis has raised the specific issues of the mandatory screening of all patients for AIDS, and whether physicians can refuse to treat AIDS patients. Additional issues concern medical experimentation on humans, the morality of involuntary commitment, and the rights of the mentally disabled.Finally, end of life issues arise about the morality of suicide, the justifiability of suicide intervention, physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia. The field of business ethics exami nes moral controversies relating to the social responsibilities of capitalist business practices, the moral status of corporate entities, deceptive advertising, insider trading, basic employee rights, job discrimination, affirmative action, drug testing, and whistle blowing. Issues in environmental ethics often overlaps with business and medical issues.These include the rights of animals, the morality of animal experimentation, preserving endangered species, pollution control, management of environmental resources, whether eco-systems are entitled to direct moral consideration, and our obligation to future generations. Controversial issues of sexual morality include monogamy versus polygamy, sexual relations without love, homosexual relations, and extramarital affairs. Finally, there are issues of social morality which examine capital punishment, nuclear war, gun control, the recreational use of drugs, welfare rights, and racism. 4. References and Further Reading Anscombe,Elizabeth â€Å"Modern Moral Philosophy,† Philosophy, 1958, Vol. 33, reprinted in her Ethics, Religion and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).  ·Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in Barnes, Jonathan, ed. , The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1984).  ·Ayer, A. J. , Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1946).  ·Baier, Kurt, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (Cornell University Press, 1958).  ·Bentham, Jeremy, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by John Bowring (London: 1838-1843). Hare, R. M. , Moral Thinking, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).  ·Hare, R. M. , The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).  ·Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, ed. , E. Curley, (Chicago, IL: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994).  ·Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), eds. David Fate Norton, Mary J. Norton (Oxford; New York: Oxf ord University Press, 2000).  ·Kant, Immanuel, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr, James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985).  ·Locke, John, Two Treatises, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).  ·MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, second edition, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1984).  ·Mackie, John L. , Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, (New York: Penguin Books, 1977).  ·Mill, John Stuart, â€Å"Utilitarianism,† in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. , J. M. Robson (London: Routledge and Toronto, Ont. : University of Toronto Press, 1991).  ·Moore, G. E. , Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).  ·Noddings, Nel, â€Å"Ethics from the Stand Point Of Women,† in Deborah L.Rhode, ed. , Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).  ·Ockham, William of, Fourth Book of the Sentences, tr. Lucan Freppert, The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988).  ·Plato, Republic, 6:510-511, in Cooper, John M. , ed. , Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).  ·Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1762), tr. Of the Law of Nature and Nations  ·Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem (1673), tr. The Whole Duty of Man according to the Law of Nature (London, 1691).  ·Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trs. J. Annas and J. Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  ·Stevenson, Charles L. , The Ethics of Language, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).  ·Sumner, William Graham, Folkways (Boston: Guinn, 1906). Author Information James Fieser Email: [email  protected] edu[->27] University of Tennessee at Martin Last updated: May 10, 2009 | Originally published: June 29, 2003 [->0] – .. /mor-epis [->1] – .. /objectiv [->2] â€⠀œ .. /time [->3] – .. plato [->4] – .. /divine-c [->5] – .. /god-west [->6] – .. /ockham [->7] – .. /relativi [->8] – .. /praise [->9] – .. /hobmoral [->10] – .. /psychego/ [->11] – .. /butler [->12] – .. /humemora [->13] – .. /non-cogn [->14] – .. /kantmeta [->15] – .. /virtue [->16] – .. /moral-ch [->17] – .. /aris-eth [->18] – .. /hum-rts [->19] – .. /locke [->20] – .. /conseque [->21] – .. /egoism [->22] – .. /bentham [->23] – .. /moore [->24] – .. /soc-cont [->25] – .. /envi-eth [->26] – .. /sexualit [->27] – mailto:[email  protected] edu

Representation of Sex and Gender in the Film Goldfinger Essay

â€Å"My Name is Bond, James Bond. † A film franchise that has spanned for a better part of this century has been engrained to generations, young, old, men and women. Bond’s suave outlook, dominating presence, and alluring sex appeal has engrained among generations how a man should conduct himself – a man’s man, and has also engrained the stereotype of how women are in this world. What are their roles, their functions and how should they be treated. In the years of the Bond movies, Bond has either pushed or represented the present times’ view on gender issues and relationships. When taken a closer look, it can be surmised that one can see the chronological progression of sex and gender issues and relationships when watching the entire 007 film franchise – how it has been in the past and how it has progressed. This paper aims to examine the existing on screen relationships within gender relations as depicted in James Bond movies. In particular, focus is given towards the women of James Bond in the various films of James Bond, especially those that are represented in the movie Goldfinger. On the other hand, focus will also be given on the variety of women shown in other James Bond movies and how they depict women and how they are able to represent the current culture towards interactions between women and men, and the roles they play in society. In addition, the paper also dips into how women represent the typical ‘Bond Girls’ and what role do they take in the plot of Bond movies. The study develops its arguments via a comprehensive discussion on the subject matter, utilizing cited references and integrating them with each other in order to churn out an effective analysis of the points of the study. Studies acquired for this research will be primarily acquired from UK sources but is not limited to and can acquire US/other sources as need be. There is no particular limit to the age of the publication, just as long as it is written based on the James Bond, the interpretation of women in these films, gender theory, and other studies that may be deemed necessary for the study. As a last point, a conclusion will be presented summarizing the key points of the paper. The methodology of acquiring the desired results will utilize qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis presents an advantage as it adheres to the concept of individuality in terms that each person or group is expected to have varying interpretations of the situation that person or the group is immersed in. This provides for a more in-depth analysis for the study as the qualitative portion of the study focuses more on the inner psyche of the individual/group and acknowledges the point that individuals and groups have different opinions on the issue/topic. It is the responsibility then of the researcher to merge these existing thoughts into a cohesive interpretation that is representative of the entire subject base. James Bond and his counterparts My name is Bond, James Bond On hindsight, the variety of 007 films that was released over the years represent how majority of society (i. e. American and British society) sees masculinity and femininity and how it has progressed throughout the decades. Bond’s representation in Goldfinger presents the deepest and most innate desires of how men see themselves and how women want their men to see, act and feel. In addition to this, the personas portrayed by women acting in Goldfinger had presented the different variations of women in their time. Their On screen relationships with the secret agent project deep-seated cultural conventions that involves mainly romance and sexual interaction between men and women that add how bond films are able to provide a mirror image of cultural fantasies and realities of modern man and woman in film and in society. It can be said that the bond movie series has taken society by storm because of the reason that they have a similarity to human fantasies and wishful thinking. The movies in a way, has defined the dreams and paranoia a particular group of 007 fanatics and within a given timeline in history (Lindner, 2003). The characters played in 007 films feed on human fantasy components desired by humans on earth such as fast cars, hard alcoholic beverages, high stakes gambling, and powerful weaponry at a moment’s notice, handsome secret agents and beautiful women at their side. When the movies were first released at 1962 onwards, 007 had appeared on the silver screen with an average of two years per interval. Sean Connery filled up the role as James Bond in the movie Goldfinger, keeping in mind how Ian Fleming had envisioned James Bond in real life. His suave attire and commanding look, although was totally different as that of a real-life spy, tapped into the imagination and perception of people at that time on how a spy or a secret should look and feel. On the other hand, following Dalton’s depiction, there was a gap of six years while Bond’s representation was re-developed and reconstructed for the 1990s post Cold War political climate in Britain and the U. S. In mid 1994, the actor Pierce Brosnan was identified to take over the role of 007 (Brosnan, 1995). But even with these changes occurring, the secret agent that is James Bond has essentially remained unswerving all throughout the movies series history (more than 40 years). The secret agent has never aged, never gotten seriously injured, never stopped drinking and more importantly has never stopped chasing the opportunity to be intimate with a sexiest and coincidentally the most intelligent women around. James Bond has become the quintessential suave secret agent, completely opposite as that of real-life secret agents, dry wit and capable intelligence officer serving for king and country. On the other hand, categorization of James Bond has naturally varied from actor to actor during the entire 40 year history and has mainly been coupled with the current social and political climates and values of the times (Lindner, 2003).

Foundation’s Edge CHAPTER SEVEN FARMER

FARMER Stor Gendibal jogged along the country road outside the university. It was not common practice for Second Foundationers to venture into the farming world of Trantor. They could do so, certainly, but when they did, they did not venture either far or for long. Gendibal was an exception and he had, in times past, wondered why. Wondering meant exploring his own mind, something that Speakers, in particular, were encouraged to do. Their minds were at once their weapons and their targets, and they had to keep both offense and defense well honed. Gendibal had decided, to his own satisfaction, that one reason he was different was because he had come from a planet that was both colder and more massive than the average inhabited planet. When he was brought to Trantor as a boy (through the net that was quietly cast throughout the Galaxy by agents of the Second Foundation on the lookout for talent), he found himself, therefore, in a lighter gravitational field and a delightfully mild climate. Naturally he enjoyed being in the open more than some of the others might. In his early years on Trantor, he grew conscious of his puny, undersized frame, and he was afraid that settling back into the comfort of a benign world would turn him flabby indeed. He therefore undertook a series of self-developing exercises that had left him still puny in appearance but kept hint wiry and with a good wind. Part of his regimen were these long walks arid joggings – about which some at the Speaker's Table muttered. Gendibal disregarded their chattering. He kept his own ways, despite the fact that he was first-generation. All the others at the Table were second – and third-generation, with parents and grandparents who had been Second Foundationers. And they were all older than he, too. What, then, was to be expected but muttering? By long custom, all minds at the Speaker's Table were open (supposedly altogether, though it was a rare Speaker who didn't maintain a comer of privacy somewhere – in the long run, ineffectively, of course) and Gendibal knew that what they felt was envy. So did they; just as Gendibal knew his own attitude was defensive, overcompensating ambition. And so did they. Besides (Gendibal's mind reverted to the reasons for his ventures into the hinterland) he had spent his childhood in a whole world – a large and expansive one, with grand and variegated scenery – and in a fertile valley of that world, surrounded by what he believed to be the most beautiful mountain ranges in the Galaxy. They were unbelievably spectacular in the grim winter of that world. He remembered his former world and the glories of a now-distant childhood. He dreamed about it often. How could he bring himself to be confined to a few dozen square miles of ancient architecture? He looked about disparagingly as he jogged. Trantor was a mild and pleasant world, but it was not a rugged and beautiful one. Though it was a farming world, it was not a fertile planet. It never had been. Perhaps that, as much as any other factor, had led to its becoming the administrative center of, first, an extensive union of planets and then of a Galactic Empire. There was no strong push to have it be anything else. It wasn't extraordinarily good for anything else. After the Great Sack, one thing that kept Trantor going was its enormous supply of metal. It was a great mine, supplying half a hundred worlds with cheap alloy steel, aluminum, titanium, copper, magnesium – returning, in this way, what it had collected over thousands of years; depleting its supplies at a rate hundreds of times faster than the original rate of accumulation. There were still enormous metal supplies available, but they were underground and harder to obtain. The Hamish farmers (who never called themselves â€Å"Trantorians,† a term they considered ill-omened and which the Second Foundationers therefore reserved for themselves) had grown reluctant to deal with the metal any further. Superstition, undoubtedly. Foolish of them. The metal that remained underground might well be poisoning the soil and further lowering its fertility. And yet, on the other hand, the population was thinly spread and the land supported them. And there were some sales of metal, always. Gendibal's eyes roved over the fiat horizon. Trantor was alive geologically, as almost all inhabited planets were, but it had been a hundred million years, at least, since the last major geological mountain-building period had occurred. What uplands existed had been eroded into gentle hills. Indeed, many of them had been leveled during the great metal-coating period of Trantor's history. Off to the south, well out of sight, was the shore of Capital Bay, and beyond that, the Eastern Ocean, both of which had been re-established after the disruption of the underground cisterns. To the north were the towers of Galactic University, obscuring the comparatively squat-but-wide Library (most of which was underground), and the remains of the Imperial Palace still farther north. Immediately on either side were farms, on which there was an occasional building. He passed groups of cattle, goats, chickens – the wide variety of domesticated animals found on any Trantorian farm. None of them paid him any mind. Gendibal thought casually that anywhere in the Galaxy, on any of the vast number of inhabited worlds, he would see these animals and that on no two worlds would they be exactly alike. He remembered the goats of home and his own tame nanny whom he had once milked. They were much larger and more resolute than the small and philosophical specimens that had been brought to Trantor and established there since the Great Sack. Over the inhabited worlds of the Galaxy, there were varieties of each of these animals, in numbers almost beyond counting, and there was no sophisticate on any world who didn't swear by his favorite variety, whether for meat, milk, eggs, wool, or anything else they could produce. As usual, there were no Hamish in view. Gendibal had the feeling that the farmers avoided being seen by those whom they referred to as â€Å"scowlers† (a mispronunciation – perhaps deliberately – of the word â€Å"scholars† in their dialect). – Superstition, again. Gendibal glanced up briefly at Trantor's sun. It was quite high in the sky, but its heat was not oppressive. In this location, at this latitude, the warmth saved mild and the cold never bit. (Gendibal ever. missed the biting cold sometimes or so he imagined. He had never revisited his native world. Perhaps, he admitted to himself, because he didn't want to be disillusioned.) He had the pleasant feel of muscles that were sharpened and tightened to keenness and he decided he had jogged just long enough. He settled down to a walk, breathing deeply. He would be ready for the upcoming Table meeting and for one last push to force a change in policy, a new attitude that would recognize the growing danger from the First Foundation and elsewhere and that would put an end to the fatal reliance on the â€Å"perfect† working of the Plan. When would they realize that the very perfection was the surest sign of danger? Had anyone but himself proposed it, he knew, it would have gone through without trouble. As things stood now, there would be trouble, but it would go through, just the same, for old Shandess was supporting him and would undoubtedly continue to do so. He would not wish to enter the history books as the particular First Speaker under whom the Second Foundation had withered. Hamish! Gendibal was startled. He became aware of the distant tendril of mind well before he saw the person. It was Hamish mind – a farmer – coarse and unsubtle. Carefully Gendibal withdrew, leaving a touch so light as to be undetectable. Second Foundation policy was very firm in this respect. The farmers were the unwitting shields of the Second Foundation. They must be left as untouched as possible. No one who came to Trantor for trade or tourism ever saw anything other than the farmers, plus perhaps a few unimportant scholars living in the past. Remove the farmers or merely tamper with their innocence and the scholars would become more noticeable – with catastrophic results. (That was one of the classic demonstrations which neophytes at the University were expected to work out for themselves. The tremendous Deviations displayed on the Prime Radiant when the farmer minds were even slightly tampered with were astonishing.) Gendibal saw him. It was a farmer, certainly, Hamish to the core. He was almost a caricature of what a Trantorian farmer should be tall and wide, brown-skinned, roughly dressed, arms bare, dark-haired, dark-eyed, a long ungainly stride. Gendibal felt as though he could smell the barnyard about him. (Not too much scorn, he thought. Preem Palver had not minded playing the role of farmer, when that was necessary to his plans. Some farmer he was – short and plump and soft. It was his mind that had fooled the teenaged Arkady, never his body.) The farmer was approaching him, clumping down the road, staring at him openly – something that made Gendibal frown. No Hamish man or woman had ever looked at him in this manner. Even the children ran away and peered from a distance. Gendibal did not slow his own stride. There would be room enough to pass the other with neither comment nor glance and that would be best. He determined to stay away from the farmer's mind. Gendibal drifted to one side, but the farmer was not going to have that. He stopped, spread his legs wide, stretched out his large arms as though to block passage, and said, â€Å"Ho! Be you scowler?† Try as he might, Gendibal could not refrain from sensing the wash of pugnacity in the approaching mind. He stopped. It would be impossible to attempt to pass by without conversation and that would be, in itself, a weary task. Used as one was to the swift and subtle interplay of sound and expression and thought and mentality that combined to make up the communication between Second Foundationers, it was wearisome to resort to word combination alone. It was like prying up a boulder by arm and shoulder, with a crowbar lying nearby. Gendibal said, quietly and with careful lack of emotion, â€Å"I am a scholar. Yes.† â€Å"Ho! You am a scowler. Don't we speak outlandish now? And cannot I see that you be one or am one?† He ducked his head in a mocking bow. â€Å"Being, as you be, small and weazen and pale and upnosed.† â€Å"What is it you want of me, Hamishman?† asked Gendibal, unmoved. â€Å"I be titled Rufirant. And Karoll be my previous.† His accent became noticeably more Hamish. His r's rolled throatily. Gendibal said, â€Å"What is it you want with me, Karoll Rufirant?† â€Å"And how be you titled, scowler?† â€Å"Does it matter? You may continue to call me ‘scholar.'† â€Å"If I ask, it matters that I be answered, little up-nosed scowler.† â€Å"Well then, I am titled Stor Gendibal and I will now go about my business.† â€Å"What be your business?† Gendibal felt the hair prickling on the back of his neck. There were other minds present. He did not have to turn to know there were three more Hamishmen behind him. Off in the distance, there were others. The farmer smell was strong. â€Å"My business, Karoll Rufirant, is certainly none of yours.† â€Å"Say you so?† Rufirant's voice rose. â€Å"Mates, he says his business be not ours.† There was a laugh from behind him and a voice sounded. â€Å"Right he be, for his business be book-mucking and ‘puter-rubbing, and that be naught for true men.† â€Å"Whatever my business is,† said Gendibal firmly, â€Å"I will be about it now.† â€Å"And how will you do that, wee scowler?† said Rufirant. â€Å"By passing you.† â€Å"You would try? You would not fear arm-stopping?† â€Å"By you and all your mates? Or by you alone?† Gendibal suddenly dropped into thick Hamish dialect. â€Å"Art not feared alone?† Strictly speaking, it was not proper to prod him in this manner, but it would stop a mass attack and that had to be stopped, lest it force a still greater indiscretion on his part. It worked. Rufirant's expression grew lowering. â€Å"If fear there be, bookboy, th'art the one to be full of it. Mates, make room. Stand back and let him pass that he may see if I be feared alane.† Rufirant lifted his great arms and moved them about. Gendibal did not fear the farmer's pugilistic science; but there was always a chance that a goodly blow might land. Gendibal approached cautiously, working with delicate speed within Rufirant's mind. Not much – just a touch, unfelt – but enough to slow reflexes that crucial notch. Then out, and into all the others, who were now gathering in greater numbers. Gendibal's Speaker mind darted back and forth with virtuosity, never resting in one mind long enough to leave a mark, but just long enough for the detection of something that might be useful. He approached the farmer catlike, watchful, aware and relieved that no one was making a move to interfere. Rufirant struck suddenly, but Gendibal saw it in his mind before any muscle had begun to tighten and he stepped to one side. The blow whistled past, with little room to spare. Yet Gendibal still stood there, unshaken. There was a collective sigh from the others. Gendibal made no attempt to either parry or return a blow. It would be difficult to parry without paralyzing his own arm and to return a blow would be of no use, far the farmer would withstand it without trouble. He could only maneuver the man as though he were a bull, forcing him to miss. That would serve to break his morale as direct opposition would not. Bull-like and roaring, Rufirant charged. GendibaI was ready and drifted to one side just sufficiently to allow the farmer to miss his clutch. Again the charge. Again the miss. GendibaI felt his own breath begin to whistle through his nose. The physical effort was small, but the mental effort of trying to control without controlling was enormously difficult. He could not keep it up long. He said – as calmly as he could while batting lightly at Rufirant's fear-depressant mechanism, trying to rouse in a minimalist manner what must surely be the farmer's superstitious dread of scholars – â€Å"I will now go about my business.† Rufirant's face distorted with rage, but for a moment he did not move. Gendibal could sense his thinking. The little scholar had melted away like magic. Gendibal could feel the other's fear rise and for a moment But then the Hamish rage surged higher and drowned the fear. Rufirant shouted, â€Å"Mates! Scowler he dancer. He do duck on nimble toes and scorns the rules of honest Hamish blow-for-blow. Seize him. Hold him. We will trade blow for blow, then. He may be firststriker, gift of me, and I – I will be last-striker.† Gendibal found the gaps among those who now surrounded him. His only chance was to maintain a gap long enough to get through, then to run, trusting to his own wind and to his ability to dull the farmers' will. Back and forth he dodged, with his mind cramping in effort. It would rat work. There were too many of them and the necessity of abiding within the rules of Trantorian behavior was too constricting. He felt hands on his arms. He was held. He would have to interfere with at least a few of the minds. It would be unacceptable and his cancer would be destroyed. But his life – his very life – was at hazard. How had this happened? The meeting of the Table was not complete. It was not the custom to wait if any Speaker were late. Nor, thought Shandess, was the Table in a mood to wait, in any case. Stor Gendibal was the youngest and far from sufficiently aware of the fact. He acted as though youth were in itself a virtue and age a matter of negligence on the part of those who should know better. Gendibal was not popular with the other Speakers. He was not, in point of fact, entirely popular with Shandess himself. But popularity was not at issue here. Delora Delarmi broke in on his reverie. She was looking at him out of wide blue eyes, her round face – with its accustomed air of innocence and friendliness – masking an acute mind (to all but other Second Foundationers of her own rank) and ferocity of concentration. She said, smiling, â€Å"First Speaker, do we wait longer?† (The meeting had not yet been formally called to order so that, strictly speaking, she could open the conversation, though another might have waited for Shandess to speak first by right of his title.) Shandess looked at her disarmingly, despite the slight breach in courtesy. â€Å"Ordinarily we would not, Speaker Delarmi, but since the Table meets precisely to hear Speaker Gendibal, it is suitable to stretch the rules.† â€Å"Where is he, First Speaker?† â€Å"That, Speaker Delarmi, I do not know.† Delarmi looked about the rectangle of faces. There was the First Speaker and what should have been eleven other Speakers. – Only twelve. Through five centuries, the Second Foundation had expanded its powers and its duties, but all attempts to expand the Table beyond twelve had failed. Twelve it had been after Seldon's death, when the second First Speaker (Seldon himself had always been considered as having been the first of the line) had established it, and twelve it still was. Why twelve? That number divided itself easily into groups of identical size. It was small enough to consult as a whole and large enough to do work in subgroups. More would have been too unwieldy; fewer, too inflexible. So went the explanations. In fact, no one knew why the number had been chosen – or why it should be immutable. But then, even the Second Foundation could find itself a slave to tradition. It took Delarmi only a flashing moment to have her mind twiddle the matter as she looked from face to face, and mind to mind, and then, sardonically, at the empty seat – the junior seat. She was satisfied that there was no sympathy at all with Gendibal. The young man, she had always felt, had all the charm of a centipede and was best treated as one. So far, only his unquestioned ability and talent had kept anyone from openly proposing trial for expulsion. (Only two Speakers had been impeached – but not convicted – in the hemimillennial history of the Second Foundation.) The obvious contempt, however, of missing a meeting of the Table was worse than many an offense and Delarmi was pleased to sense that the mood for trial had moved forward rather more than a notch. She said, â€Å"First Speaker, if you do not know the whereabouts of Speaker Gendibal, I would be pleased to tell you.† â€Å"Yes, Speaker?† â€Å"Who among us does not know that this young man† (she used no honorific in speaking of him, and it was something that everyone noted, of course) â€Å"finds business among the Hamish continually? What that business might be, I do not ask, but he is among them now and his concern with them is clearly important enough to take precedence over this Table.† â€Å"I believe,† said another of the Speakers, â€Å"that he merely walks or jogs as a form of physical exercise.† Delarmi smiled again. She enjoyed smiling. It cost her nothing. â€Å"The University, the Library, the Palace, and the entire region surrounding these are ours. It is small in comparison with the planet itself, but it contains room enough, I think, for physical exercise. – First Speaker, might we not begin?† The First Speaker sighed inwardly. He had the full power to keep the Table waiting – or, indeed, to adjourn the meeting until a time when Gendibal was present. No First Speaker could long function smoothly, however, without at least the passive support of the other Speakers and it was never wise to irritate them. Even Preem Palver had occasionally been forced into cajolery to get his way. – Besides, Gendibal's absence was annoying, even to the First Speaker. The young Speaker might as well learn he was not a law unto himself. And now, as First Speaker, he did speak first, saying, â€Å"We will begin. Speaker Gendibal has presented some startling deductions from Prime Radiant data. He believes that there is some organization that is working to. maintain the Seldon Plan more efficiently than we can and that it does so for its own purpose. We must, in his view therefore, learn more about it out of self-defense. You all have been informed of this, and this meeting is to allow you all a chance to question Speaker Gendibal, in order that we may come to some conclusion as to future policy.† It was, in fact, even unnecessary to say this much. Shandess held his mind open, so they all knew. Speaking was a matter of courtesy. Delarmi looked about swiftly. The other ten seemed content to allow her to take on the role of anti-Gendibal spokesperson. She said, â€Å"Yet Gendibal† (again the omission of the honorific) â€Å"does not know and cannot say what or who this other organization is.† She phrased it unmistakably as a statement, which skirted the edge of rudeness. It was as much as to say: I can analyze your mind; you need not bother to explain. The First Speaker recognized the rudeness and made the swift decision to ignore it. â€Å"The fact that Speaker Gendibal† (he punctiliously avoided the omission of the honorific and did not even point up the fact by stressing it) â€Å"does not know and cannot say what the other organization is, does not mean it does not exist. The people of the First Foundation, through most of their history, knew virtually nothing about us and, in fact, know next to nothing about us now. Do you question our existence?† â€Å"It does not follow,† said Delarmi, â€Å"that because we are unknown and yet exist, that anything, in order to exist, need only be unknown.† And she laughed lightly. â€Å"True enough. That is why Speaker Gendibal's assertion must be examined most carefully. It is based on rigorous mathematical deduction, which I have gone over myself and which I urge you all to consider. It is† (he searched for a cast of mind that best expressed his views) â€Å"not unconvincing.† â€Å"And this First Foundationer, Golan Trevize, who hovers in your mind but whom you do not mention?† (Another rudeness and this time the First Speaker flushed a bit.) â€Å"What of him?† The First Speaker said, â€Å"It is Speaker Gendibal's thought that this man, Trevize, is the tool – perhaps an unwitting one – of this organization and that we must not ignore him.† â€Å"If,† said Delarmi, sitting back in her chair and pushing her graying hair backward and out of her eyes, â€Å"this organization – whatever it is – exists and if it is dangerously powerful in its mental capabilities and is so hidden, is it likely to be maneuvering so openly by way of someone as noticeable as an exiled Councilman of the First Foundation?† The First Speaker said gravely, â€Å"One would think not. And yet I have noticed something that is most disquieting. I do not understand it.† Almost involuntarily he buried the thought in his mind, ashamed that others might see it. Each of the Speakers noted the mental action and, as was rigorously required, respected the shame. Delarmi did, too, but she did so impatiently. She said, in accordance with the required formula, â€Å"May we request that you let us know your thoughts, since we understand and forgive any shame you may feel?† The First Speaker said, â€Å"Like you, I do not see on what grounds one should suppose Councilman Trevize to be a tool of the other organization, or what purpose he could possibly serve if he were. Yet Speaker Gendibal seems sure of it, and one cannot ignore the possible value of intuition in anyone who has qualified for Speaker. I therefore attempted to apply the Plan to Trevize.† â€Å"To a single person?† said one of the Speakers in low voiced surprise, and then indicated his contrition at once for having accompanied the question with a thought that was clearly the equivalent of: What a fool! â€Å"To a single person,† said the First Speaker, â€Å"and you are right. What a fool I am! I know very well that the Plan cannot possibly apply to individuals, not even to small groups of individuals. Nevertheless, I was curious. I extrapolated the Interpersonal Intersections far past the reasonable limits, but I did it in sixteen different ways and chose a region rather than a point. I then made use of all the details we know about Trevize – a Councilman of the First Foundation does not go completely unnoticed – and of the Foundation's Mayor. I then threw it all together, rather higgledy-piggledy, I'm afraid.† He paused. † Well?† said Delarmi. â€Å"I gather you†¦ – Were the results surprising?† â€Å"There weren't any results, as you might all expect,† said the First Speaker. â€Å"Nothing can be done with a single individual, and yet – and yet†¦Ã¢â‚¬  â€Å"And yet?† â€Å"I have spent forty years analyzing results and I have grown used to obtaining a clear feeling of what the results would be before they were analyzed – and I have rarely been mistaken. In this case, even though there were no results, I developed the strong feeling that Gendibal was right and that Trevize should not be left to himself.† â€Å"Why not, First Speaker?† asked Delarmi, clearly taken aback at the strong feeling in the First Speaker's mind. â€Å"I am ashamed,† said the First Speaker, â€Å"that I have let myself be tempted into using the Plan for a purpose for which it is not fit. I am further ashamed now that I am allowing myself to be influenced by something that is purely intuitive. – Yet I must, for I feel this very strongly. If Speaker Gendibal is right – if we are in danger from an unknown direction – then I feel that when the time comes that our affairs are at a crisis, it will be Trevize who will hold and play the deciding card.† â€Å"On what basis do you feel this?† said Delarmi, shocked. First Speaker Shandess looked about the table miserably, â€Å"I have no basis. The psychohistorical mathematics produces nothing, but as I watched the interplay of relationships, it seemed to me that Trevize is the key to everything. Attention must be paid to this young man.† Gendibal knew that he would not get back in time to join the meeting of the Table. It might be that he would not get back at all. He was held firmly and he tested desperately about him to see how he could best manage to force them to release him. Rufirant stood before him now, exultant. â€Å"Be you ready now, scowler? Blow for blow, strike for strike, Hamish-fashion. Come then, art the smaller; strike then first.† Gendibal said, â€Å"Will someone hold thee, then, as I be held?† Rufirant said, â€Å"Let him go. Nah nah. His arms alane. Leave arms free, but hold legs strong. We want no dancing.† Gendibal felt himself pinned to the ground. His arms were free. â€Å"Strike, scowler,† said Rufirant. â€Å"Give us a blow.† And then Gendibal's probing mind found something that answered – indignation, a sense of injustice and pity. He had no choice; he would have to run the risk of outright strengthening and then improvising on the basis of There was no need! He had not touched this new mind, yet it reacted as he would have wished. Precisely. He suddenly became aware of a small figure-stocky, with long, tangled black hair and arms thrust outward – careening madly into his field of view and pushing madly at the Hamish farmer. The figure was that of a woman. Gendibal thought grimly that it was a measure of his tension and preoccupation that he had not noted this till his eyes told him so. â€Å"Karoll Rufirant!† She shrieked at the farmer. â€Å"Art bully and coward! Strike for strike, Hamish-fashion? You be two times yon scowler's size. You'll be in more sore danger attacking me. Be there renown in pashing yon poor spalp? There be shame, I'm thinking. It will be a fair heap of finger-pointing and there'll be full saying, ‘Yon be Rufirant, renowned baby-smasher.' It'll be laughter, I'm thinking, and no decent Hamishman will be drinking with you – and no decent Hamishwoman will be ought with you.† Rufirant was trying to stem the torrent, warding off the blows she was aiming at him, attempting weakly to answer with a placating, â€Å"Now, Sura. Now, Sura.† Gendibal was aware that hands no longer grasped him, that Rufirant no longer glared at him, that the minds of all were no longer concerned with him. Sura was not concerned with him, either; her fury was concentrated solely on Rufirant. Gendibal, recovering, now looked to take measures to keep that fury alive and to strengthen the uneasy shame flooding Rufirant's mind, and to do both so lightly and skillfully as to leave no mark. Again, there was no need. The woman said, â€Å"All of you back-step. Look here. If it be not sufficient that this Karoll – heap be like giant to this starveling, there must be five or six more of you ally-friends to share in shame and go back to farm with glorious tale of dewing-do in baby-smashing. ‘I held the spalp's arm,' you'll say, ‘and giant Rufirant-block pashed him in face when he was not to back-strike.' And you'll say, ‘But I held his foot, so give me also – glory.' And Rufirant-chunk will say, ‘I could not have kiln on his lane, so my furrow-mates pinned him and, with help of all six, I gloried on him.'† â€Å"But Sura,† said Rufirant, almost whining, â€Å"I told scowler he might have first-shrike.† â€Å"And fearful you were of the mighty blows of his thin arms, not so, Rufirant thickhead. Come. Let him go where he be going, and the rest of you to your homes back-crawl, if so be those homes will still find a welcome-making for you. You had all best hope the grand deeds of this day be forgotten. And they will not be, for I be spreading them far-wide, if you do make me any the more fiercely raging than I be raging now.† They trooped off quietly, heads hanging, not looking back. Gendibal stared after them, then back at the woman. She was dressed in blouse and trousers, with roughmade shoes on her feet. Her face was wet with perspiration and she breathed heavily. Her nose was rather large, her breasts heavy (as best Gendibal could tell through the looseness of her blouse), and her bare arms muscular. – But then, the Hamishwomen worked in the fields beside their men. She was looking at him sternly, arms akimbo. â€Å"Well, scowler, why be lagging? Go on to Place of Scowlers. Be you feared? Shall I company you?† Gendibal could smell the perspiration on clothes that were clearly not freshly laundered, but under the circumstances it would be most discourteous to show any repulsion. â€Å"I thank you, Miss Sura†¦Ã¢â‚¬  â€Å"The name be Novi,† she said gruffly. â€Å"Sura Novi. You may say Novi. It be unneeded to moresay.† â€Å"I thank you, Novi. You have been very helpful. You be welcome to company me, not for fear of mine but for company-pleasure in you.† And he bowed gracefully, as he might have bowed to one of the young women at the University. Novi flushed, seemed uncertain, and then tried to imitate his gesture. â€Å"Pleasure – be mine,† she said, as though searching for words that would adequately express her pleasure and lend an air of culture. They walked together. Gendibal knew well that each leisurely step made him the more unforgiveably late for the Table meeting, but by now he had had a chance to think on the significance of what had taken place and he was icily content to let the lateness grow. The University buildings were looming ahead of them when Sura Novi stopped and said hesitantly, â€Å"Master Scowler?† Apparently, Gendibal thought, as she approached what she called the â€Å"Place of Scowlers,† she grew mare polite. He had a momentary urge to say, â€Å"Address you not yon poor spalp?† – But that would embarrass her beyond reason. â€Å"Yes, Novi?† â€Å"Be it very fine like and rich in Place of Scowlers?† â€Å"It's nice,† said Gendibal. â€Å"I once dreamed I be in Place. And – and I be scowler.† â€Å"Someday,† said Gendibal politely, â€Å"I'll show it thee.† Her look at him showed plainly she didn't take it for mere politeness. She said, â€Å"I can write. I be taught by schoolmaster. If I write letter to thee,† she tried to make it casual, â€Å"how do I mark it so it come to thee?† â€Å"Just say, ‘Speaker's House, Apartment 27,' and it will come to me. But I must go, Novi.† He bowed again, and again she tried to imitate the action. They moved off in opposite directions and Gendibal promptly put her out of his mind. He thought instead of the Table meeting and, in particular, of Speaker Delora Delarmi. His thoughts were not gentle.

Diversity and healthcare

Managing a Diverse Workforce The health care institution is making the possible steps to address the concerns disclosed during the mock accreditation assessment. Various working teams and groups are being organized to develop corrective action plans for forecasted dilemmas as they become evident. For this scenario, I was chosen to lead a specific project team. Because I’m aware that diversity is an important element to producing successful outcomes, I’ve scheduled a meeting with other team leaders to provide information on this subject. Therefore, a preparation for a report on the value of diversity on the following was initiated: †¢ Work Groups Functions †¢ Different Forms †¢ The types of diversity as it is important among healthcare organizations †¢ Tools that can help ensure that diversity principle exists in these project teams Effective work groups’ main goal is to engage in external knowledge sharing; they exchange information, ideas, and feedback, the values of sharing different ideas and knowledge increases with diversity, their different organizational affiliations, roles, or positions, can expose the group to unique sources of knowledge. It is hypothesized that if members of structurally diverse work groups engage in external knowledge sharing, they will be exposed to different elements of work principles because of this active exchange of knowledge through unique external sources can establish new information frontiers. The following values should be taken in consideration when dealing with diversity within a workgroup: †¢ There is a need to stick to the regulations and be pertinent while communicating with a diverse workforce. †¢ It is crucial to avoid the use of slang words when having a conversation with individuals coming from a diverse workforce. †¢ . There is a need to understand how the persons from different cultures interpret communications. †¢ There should be proper mentoring of people from different cultures and sectors. †¢ There should be communications training given to local employees while communicating with a diverse workforce. †¢ Extra training should be given to foreign employees while communicating with a diverse workforce. †¢ Open-doors policy should be moderated while communicating with a diverse workforce The work group function is to build skills and knowledge while helping others to understand what each team member does, and actively reflecting on team accomplishments and challenges. The values of diversity forms are categories in social diversity, diversity in values, and information resource diversity. There are also moderating variables such as work type and work interdependence, on workgroup performance Organizations are now initiating to discard the old stereotype of the `ideal manager` and are beginning to consider the idea that realized factors such as any genders, any ages, racial groups, ethnic affiliation and cultural types can produce excellent managers. Healthcare organizations are able to see more creativity and innovations due to the embracement of letting go of this old stereotype in which the resulting diversity can bring a competitive advantage to the healthcare organization. To reach this point, healthcare administrators must grasp several concepts. They must first have the ability to understand exactly what diversity entails. Then there should also be an understanding of the purpose behind diversity management. Third, healthcare administrators must understand that other unknown or invisible biases do exist in their respective workplace. Finally, managers should be aware of the solutions they can employ to deal with the issues of diversity management; tools that can help ensure that diversity exists in these project teams for better competency. Specific skills and knowledge areas essential for managing a diverse workforce with sensitivity and competency begin with managers who knowledgeable in cross cultural skills, business practices and customs as well as possess increased knowledge about cultural sensitivity issues and communication styles of different cultures in order to operate and communication and thus function effectively in an increasingly diverse workforce. Managers must have developed great communication styles attuned to different cultures to prevent any communication gaps and confusion while relaying info to a diverse workforce. Managers need superior interpersonal and communication skills to lead any workforce especially one that is made up of various ethnic groups, generations, and other orientations. Knowledge of diversity principles is essential. All employees’ wants and delegated needs significantly evolve according to how they want their life stages to be characterized, and an efficient manager will adjust to these types of changes. By drastically addressing these changes, managers can structure a stable organizational culture out of identified diversity. (Goliath Business Knowledge on Demand, 2003) References Goliath Business Knowledge on Demand. (2003, June 01). Retrieved February 29, 2003, from Industry & Market Reports: http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0198-63372/Diversity-management-an-imperative-for.html Liebler, J. G. (2004). Management Principles for Heath Professional. Sudbury, MA:

Inventory management Literature review Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Inventory management - Literature review Example In scientific meaning, the inventory management finds the way of maintaining the stock to meet the demands for production in order to provide the right product at the right time at the competitive prices with right quantities. Objectives of inventory management include as the best services for customers, minimizing the cost of the inventory, optimized use of the machine and men, and achieving the best production targets. According to Waters (2003) inventory management works for three main objectives as it manages the flow of material or products through the entire chain of supply. Inventory management helps the logistic in order to achieve the aims of the organization. Inventory managers support the managers to be sure about availability of the needed goods. The main aim of inventory management is the arrangement of all material of library in a proper manner. The books must arrange in accurate order. The librarian periodically checks for missing books (Xavier University Library 2013). Inventory management like many other activities of the company contributes the welfare for the company. Logistic operations of the company contribute to profit in marketing services and financial requirements of the company. Inventory management meets the demands of the customers at the minimum cost. Inventory management optimizes the support in the three main areas as inventory cost, customer services and operating costs (Wild 2002). The book by O’Neil (1998) is based on the management of library and archival security. The author focused on the management of the library as well as the security. Libraries are the treasures of knowledge and information, so security is very important. The libraries of universities are mostly having donors. If there is a lack in management of the library, it will give a bad impact of university in front of donors. The proper inventory management system is required to follow for the maintenance of library. The investment